Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon
185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960)
Plaintiff prays for an injunction to restrain defendant playing football or engaging in related activities for anyone other than the plaintiff without the plaintiff’s consent during the term of a contract or contracts allegedly entered into by the parties on November 30, 1959, and an order declaring the existence of a valid written contract or contracts. Defendant denies he ever entered into a contract or contracts as alleged and further claims, as defenses to plaintiff’s claims, fourteen affirmative defenses.
Cannon never formally accepted the contract offered, therefore it is only an offer. The Commissioner ...view middle of the document...
Plaintiff argues that an injury was sustained during the performance of a three-year contract he is entitled to his salary for the remaining term of the contract. Defendant argues that they were three separate one year contract and would only be liable to pay for the season the injury took place.
After determining that the exercise of the option clause had the effect of creating a new contract with the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
[I]t follows that Hennigan was not entitled to compensation for the 1967 football season from the Chargers. He suffered no injury while in the performance of any services required of him after the option was exercised. Consequently, he is not entitled to payment under paragraph 15 (the injury provision)
The result reached above concerning Sample’s second claim is thus on all fours with Hennigan.
Reviewing the dispositions, the court denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on both its first and second causes of action….
Eckles v. Sharman
548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977)
This is an action by the owner of a professional basketball team for breach of contract by a former coach and for the inducement of that breach by the owner of another professional basketball team. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for $250,000 against the coach and for $175,000 against the inducing owner. We reverse and remand with directions.
We have repeatedly held that a verdict may not be directed unless the evidence all points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference which sustain the position of the party against whom the motion is made….On the record presented it may not be said, as a matter of law, that the option and pension clauses were unessential and hence severable. Neither can it be said, as a matter of law, that without the resolution of the controversy over those clauses Sharman agreed to the assignment of the contract to the owners of the Utah Stars. The pertinent intent questions required factual determination by the jury under proper instructions. The court erred in directing a verdict against Sharman and in favor of Mountain States on the liability issue.
The judgments are severally reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial in...