April 17, 2012
Longer Paper #1
PHL 302 – Pierce
“Sexually Using Another Person”
In his article, Thomas Mappes talks about coercion and deception amid individuals who are responsible for using another person without their conversant, intended consent. Mappes tries to verify when it is immoral for one person to utilize another as a means to exploit the user and when one is responsible of sexually using another person. He asserts that using another person is acceptable when both parties have agreed upon their intended and informed consent. Information must be accessible to enable persons to willingly decide whether or not to partake. It is to guarantee respect ...view middle of the document...
We also notice further moral failure when the other person is autonomous but her autonomy is undercut. The second type of failure can occur in a couple of ways, the first being deception. Deception is in fact intentional, lying or misrepresentation. Stating what’s not the case or making a gesture that conveys such a statement. By one person stating that they are not in a faithful relationship in order to have sex with another is creating deception. When an individual claims that they have been tested for STI’s and that they are clean when this is clearly not true at all is also creating deception. Also, withholding relevant information is also a form of deception; failure to disclose information is morally unjust. Like deception, coercion is also mentioned amongst the moral failures. There are two types of coercion. “Occurrent” coercion, involves the use of bodily force, and “dispositional” coercion, which involves the threat and/or risk of physical force.
One ethical idea is that legitimately consensual contribution in sexual action requires not an allusion of coercion or anxiety of any type. Although engaging in sexual actions can be perilous or unsafe in many ways, bodily, expressively through ones mind, and metaphysically, we would be delighted to be sure that any person who takes on sexual doings does so completely willingly. Some philosophers have disputed that this proposal can be apprehended only when there is considerable financial and public fairness between the persons caught up in a particular sexual encounter. For example, a society that demonstrates discrepancies in the revenue or wealth of its many members are one in which particular people will be exposed to financial oppression. If a number of groups of people have a reduced amount of monetary and societal authority than others, members of these groups will be consequently out in the open to sexual oppression, amongst other kinds. One instantaneous claim of this consideration is that prostitution, which to various sexual liberals is a commerce arrangement prepared by a contributor of sexual services and a user, and has also mainly characterized by sufficiently free and clued-up authority, may be ethically immoral, if the monetary circumstances of the prostitute acts as a type of burden that counteracts the intended disposition of his or her contribution. Additionally, women with children who are reasonably reliant on their spouses may possibly discover themselves in the situation of having to take in sexual actions whether they desire to or not, for concern of being neglected; these women may also not be participating in sexual actions entirely willingly. The woman who permits herself to be influenced into sex by her spouse fears that if she answers “no” regularly, she will endure economical struggles, as well as physical and psychological mishaps.
The viewpoint on the existence of some kinds of pressures, even in the slightest bit, is...