TOPIC: Foreign Policy of Pakistan under General Pervez Mussharaaf
SUBMITTED TO: Honarable, Prof: Dr.Ayaz Sahib
SUBMITTED BY: Usman Ali
SEMESTER: M.Phil 2nd
SUBJECT: Foreign policy Analysis
Department of Political Science
FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN UNDER GENERAL MUSHARRAF REGIME
1. PRE 9/11FOREIGN POLICY OF MUSHARRAF
2. POST 9/11 FOREIGN POLICY OF MUSHARRAF
a. Pakistan relation with United state (US)
I. Ecnomic benefits
II. Defence benefets
b. PAK-AFGAN RELATION
c. PAKISTAN –INDIA RELATION
d. PAK –CHINA ...view middle of the document...
No real progress was made but the meeting set the stage for subsequent summit meetings between Musharraf and his Indian counterparts. The president appeared to be slipping into a role that promised a period of reflection on how to reconstruct the country domestic and foreign policy, but that all was changed within two months by the new reality created by the September 11 attacks on the United States
2. Post 9/11 foreign policy of Musharraf
a) Relation with US
Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the US administration concluded that the attackers had probably originated from Afghanistan and that any effective counterattack would require the cooperation of Pakistan. US govt gave Pakistan a choice to align itself with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or with Washington. In response to US govt General Musharraf made a snap decision Washington would get what it wanted.
“There is no doubt that General Musharraf initially cast his lot with the United States mainly as a result of deep fears about what U.S. enmity might imply for Pakistan’s longstanding rivalry with India, its efforts at economic revival, its nuclear weapons program, and its equities in the conflict over Kashmir.6 Desirous of protecting Islamabad’s interests in these areas and to avoid Pakistan becoming a target in the campaign against terrorism, Musharraf reluctantly cut loose Islamabad’s ties with the Taliban— a force it had nurtured, trained, and equipped for almost a decade in its effort to secure control over Afghanistan— and stood aside as the U.S.-led coalition assisted its detested antagonist”1
Before 9/11 he was perceived as a military dictator who should announce and abide by a road map for the restoration of democracy. Since then his status has been transformed. The Western world has a stake in his survival. This status has been assiduously cultivated by Musharraf who has projected his regime as the only reliable defence against a fundamentalist takeover in Pakistan.
“Since many Western and other international policy-makers broadly accept that argument, the US and the Commonwealth have been unusually tolerant of Pakistan’s break with democracy. Indeed, Pakistan even managed to get away with little more than a diplomatic rap on the knuckles after the sensational revelation that its top nuclear scientist, Dr A.Q. Khan, had for years been proliferating nuclear weapons technology, probably with the knowledge of the army.” 2
General Musharraf knows that to maintain such international support he has to continue to be seen as an active participant in Washington war on terror.
“The Bush administration has always provided the General with unqualified public backing, some in Washington have been suspicious of Islamabad’s motives since 9/11, arguing that it is only helping the US because it has little option and that Pakistan is far from serious about confronting the Islamic ...