ARC-Jim Floyd: RAeS Avro Arrow Lecture
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Jim Floyd:Royal Aeronautical Society Lecture
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Jim Floyd:
RAeS Lecture
This
republication has been made possible thanks to
the assistance of
The
Royal Aeronautical Society and
Dr. James C. Floyd. This is quite a
lengthy lecture and was presented in
December 1958. At that time the Arrow
was in phase one flight tests.
We hope you enjoy this piece of aviation history.
Scott McArthur. Webmaster, Arrow Recovery
Canada.
The
Fourteenth British Commonwealth Lecture
The Canadian Approach to All-Weather
Interceptor Development
by
J. C. FLOYD, A.M.C.T., P.Eng., F.C.A.l.,
M.I.A.S., F.R.Ac.S.
(Vice-President, Engineering, Avro Aircraft Limited, Canada)
The
Fourteenth British Commonwealth Lecture," The
Canadian Approach to All-Weather Interceptor Development," by
Mr.J. C. FLOYD, A.M.C.T., P.Eng., F.C.A.l., M.I.A.S.,
F.R.Ac.S. was given in the 9th October 1958 at the
Royal Institution, Albemarle Street, London, W.1.
The Chair was taken by Dr. E. S. Moult, C.B.E., Ph.D., B.Sc., F.R.Ae.S.,
Vice-president of the Society, deputising for the President, Sir Arnold
Hall, M.A., F.R.S., F.R.Ae.S., who was ill.
Dr. Moult first read a telegram from the President and then introduced
the Lecturer, a distinguished Canadian engineer, for this Fourteenth
Commonwealth Lecture. Mr. Floyd joined A. V. Roe and Co. Ltd., at Manchester,
as an apprentice in 1929, progressing through the design and production
offices to become Chief Projects Engineer in 1944. Immediately after
the War he joined A. V. Roe Canada Ltd., at first as Chief Technical
Officer, becoming Chief Design Engineer in 1949, Works Manager 1951,
and Chief Engineer in 1952. He is now Vice-President, Engineering, Avro
Aircraft Ltd. Mr. Floyd became a naturalized Canadian in 1950 and in
the same year was the first non-American to receive the Wright Brothers
Medal, which was awarded for his contributions to aeronautics, including
his design of the Avro Jetliner. More recently, he had been known for
his work on the Avro CF-100 interceptor and for the Avro Arrow, which
made its first flight in March 1958.
INDEX
(selectable
links)
PAGE 1
INTRODUCTION
RCAF
REQUIREMENTS
PAGE 2
BRIEF
HISTORY
CONFIGURATION
WING
DESIGN
LEADING
EDGE
NOTCH AND EXTENSION
PAGE 3
DROOPING
ANHEDRAL
HIGH
WING
AREA
RULE
ENGINE
AND INTAKES
PAGE 4
AIR
INTAKE
BASIC
STRUCTURAL DESIGN
WING
FUSELAGE
UNDERCARRIAGE
ANALYSIS
FATIGUE
ACOUSTIC
ANALYSIS
TESTING
PAGE 5
FLUTTER
STUDY
WING
FIN
AND RUDDER
CONTROL
SURFACE BUZZ
GROUND
RESONANCE
FLIGHT
FLUTTER TESTING
MATERIALS
PAGE 6
FLYING
CONTROL SYSTEM
DAMPING
SYSTEM
FIRE
CONTROL SYSTEM
PAGE 7
WEAPON
PACK
FREE
FLIGHT MODELS
DATA
ACQUISION
PAGE 8
GROUND
TEST PROGRAM
TRANSIENT
HEATING TESTS
SYSTEM
TESTING
FLYING
CONTROL SYSTEM RIG
FUEL
SYSTEM RIG
A/C
SYSTEM RIG
OTHER
TESTS
PAGE 9
CREW
ESCAPE SYSTEM
WIND
TUNNEL TESTS
GROUND
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
POLICY
OF MANUFACTURE
FLIGHT
TEST PROGRAM
PAGE 10
EVALUATION
DEFENSE
ENVIRONMENT
WEAPON
SYSTEM CONCEPT
POSTSCRIPT
NOTE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION
  In
preparing this lecture I was conscious of the fact
that there were many phases of the development of a
modern fighter which I had not covered, and which would
possibly be of greater interest to the specialists
on that particular subject than those that I did include.
To them I offer my apologies, however, this lecture
is not intended to be a handbook or reference on the
design of all-weather fighter aircraft, but was prepared
more or less as a chronicle of the main events leading
up to the current development flying of Canada's newest
defence weapon system, the supersonic all-weather CF-105,
or Avro Arrow, and its associated equipment and environment
(Fig. 1).
   Within the limits of security I have tried to give a broad-brush
picture of some of the philosophy behind the establishment of the Weapon System,
and deal also in the broad sense with many of the design and development problems
encountered in a project of this magnitude. Security precludes the disclosure
of actual detailed performance, either specified or achieved on the Arrow up
to the present time and also prevents the quotation of some of the results of
tests described in the text.
FIG.1
R.C.A.F.
REQUIRMENTS
  Canada's
chosen role in military air power is one of defence,
and Canada does not maintain any bombing or tactical
Air Force.   Environmentally, while geographic
proximity to the United States obviously influences
the choice of systems and armament to ensure reasonable
compatibility with the complex U.S.A.F. North American
defence system, and the traditional association with
the R.A.F. in the United Kingdom again influences
the basic establishment and strength of the RCAF,
there are unique requirements and conditions in maintaining
an adequate air defensive system in Canada which
have led the RCAF to establish the requirement for
an aircraft particularly suited to these conditions.
  Canada's northern frontier is a vast unpopulated expanse which, from
coast to coast, is second in length only to that of
Soviet Russia. Air defence bases are, of necessity, few and far between.
Defensive interceptors must be capable of long range operation by day
or by night, in any weather. The climate is anything but temperate,
varying from near tropical conditions to sub zero temperatures, and
fighters must have a very high reliability in this relatively abnormal
environment.
   Since Northern Canada is the first line of defence for the North
American continent, our aircraft must be equipped with an automatic fire control
system which will ensure the maximum probability of kill on the first pass, and
the most potent airborne weapons available.
   Canada learned a hard lesson in the Second World War, when she depended
upon other sources for her front line aircraft. To quote the Chief of Air Staff
at the time of decision to proceed with the " home brew ". In the early
days of the fighting, Canadian squadrons operating overseas were low on the list
for equipping with the latest types, and on one occasion, even Canadian-built
Hurricanes, sorely needed by home-based squadrons to meet a Japanese threat in
the Aleutians, were allocated to Russia.
  In a sense. this is quite understandable, since it is like expecting
a neighbour in the middle of a fire in his own house, to hand over one of his
insufficient number of fire extinguishers so that you may prevent fire spreading
to yours. However, it gave Canada a " loneliness complex," the cure
for which I believe has turned out very well.
  When, in 1946, the RCAF made the decision to re-equip its front line
fighter squadrons with a two-place twin-engined day and night all-weather interceptor
with a particularly long range capability, a team of RCAF officers visited aircraft
factories in the United Kingdom and the United States to ascertain whether there
was an aircraft on the drawing boards which was likely to fill their requirement.
Apparently there was not, and they persuaded the Canadian Government to take
the momentous step of financing the design and development of a suitable aircraft
in Canada. The CF-100 all-weather fighter was the result.
  The outcome of this joint decision must be judged on the basis that,
in addition to being the standard Canadian all-weather fighter for many years,
the CF-100 is now in service with the RCAF Air Division in N.A.T.O., and was
recently chosen in keen competition with other available types to re-equip the
Belgian Air Force. The RCAF CF-100 squadrons are also now an integral part of
the North American Air Defence System under NORAD.
  In the autumn of 1952, the RCAF decided that because of the increase
in the threat, they would have to replace the CF-100 within a specified time
by a supersonic all-weather fighter, and an evaluation team was again sent out
to the countries in the Western Alliance who might have a suitable interceptor,
and it was again decided that none of these countries had a project, either in
design or contemplated, which fully met the Canadian requirement.
  Once again, the decision was taken to design, develop, and produce
in Canada. This decision was not taken on the basis
that there happened to be an established aircraft industry in Canada,
although this obviously had some influence on the decision. However,
the Chief of the Air Staff at that time, Air Marshal Slemon, made it
quite clear that Canada was not in a position to undertake the development
of a new aircraft if a suitable type was being designed, developed,
or produced in either the United States or the United Kingdom, and
the decision to design and develop in Canada was taken entirely because
of the peculiar Canadian defence requirements, the non-availability
of a suitable weapon elsewhere, and the ability to meet the Canadian
requirements which had already been established by the Canadian aircraft
industry.
BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE PROJECT
  Preliminary
studies on a supersonic aircraft to replace the CF-100
for the Canadian squadrons had been made at Avro during
1952 early 1953. In May 1953 RCAF Specification AIR
7-3 was issued, and this became the basis for further
design studies.   In July 1953 a Ministerial
directive was issued from the Department of Defence
Production authorizing the design study of an aircraft
to meet AIR 7-3. Preliminary design on this aircraft,
given the project CF-105, was completed by the summer
of 1954.
  The initial aircraft had two Rolls-Royce RB-106 engines with afterburners,
a two-man integrated fire control system, and the armament was a mixture air-to-air
missiles and 2.75 in. air-to-air rockets.
  By the end of 1953 preliminary loads and sizes had been established
for the complete aircraft, and certain wind tunnel work had been done to establish
the dynamic parameters. The production engineers also establishing manufacturing
techniques.
  In early 1954 the RB-106 engine project abandoned by Rolls-Royce,
and the choice of engines was therefore again in the mill. Orenda were at that
time designing a large supersonic engine as a private venture, and this engine
was well matched to our requirements. However, it was obvious that this would
not be available for the first few aircraft. TheCurtiss-Wright J.67 engine
appeared to be the most suitable engine for the earlier version, and
the first few aircraft were therefore designed around the J.67. However,
in 1955 it became obvious that the USAF were going to abandon the development
of the J.67, and the Pratt and Whitney J.75 was substituted. The design
of the aircraft had been well along on the J.67 version, and an appreciable
amount of redesign had to be done to accommodate the J.75.
  Aerodynamically,
the CF-105 was, of necessity, a considerable advancement
over contemporary aircraft. and there were few reports
or tests available on which to base a firm, production
type, design. Stability and control problems were probably
the most difficult to assess and an extensive wind tunnel
programme was instituted.
   However, since the design of the aircraft had to proceed at the
same time, the basic aircraft design was frozen on the basis of stability and
control characteristics largely predicted from theory. By mid-1954 production
drawings were going out to manufacturing.
  I would like to deal briefly with some of the philosophy behind the
configuration which we chose to meet the specification
CONVERTED TO HTML,
AND HYPERLINKS ADDED, MARCH 28, 2001.
Scott McArthur.
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